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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Power Without Responsibility or Responsibility 
Without Power? 
Recent Developments in the Jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Securities Commission 
Mary G. Condon * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In its present legislative form and in its administration, the Ontario Securities 
Act has taken onto itself powers which this Commission believes were never 
intended ... To correct this it believes that legislation should be enacted w hich 
will clearly define and limit the powers of the administrative authority to requi­
rements under such legislation, and that these should not be deviated from for 
any reason of policy or otherwise. 
These sentiments could plausibly have been expressed by some of 
those making submissions to the 1994 Ontario Task Force on Securities 
Regulation, or indeed by the plaintiffs in the Ainsley case, which pre­
ceded the Task Force deliberations. Yet they are of considerably earlier 
origin, being extracted from the Ontario Royal Commission on Mining,' 
released in 1944, the acknowledged inspiration for the first comprehen­
sive piece of securities legislation in this province,2 passed in 1945. 
Thus, the first point to be made about the current controversy surround­
ing the legality of the Ontario Securities Commission's (OSC) powers 
is that it is by no means a new phenomenon, but has accompanied the 
agency from its inception. It is likewise ironic that the issue which 
sparked a political rethinking of the OSC's jurisdiction in 1944 was 
virtually the same one that prompted recent judicial and political ex­
amination of this issue, that of the regulation of professionals in the 
retail, speculative segment of the securities market. Even in an era of 
globalization, transnationals and international competitiveness, some 
regulatory issues are constant. 
With this historical context in mind, this commentary will outline 
the trajectory of the current jurisdictional debate surrounding the OSC. 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
' Ontario. Report of the Royal Ontario Mining Commission. 1944 (Urquhart Com­
mission) at 18-19. 
2 Securities Act 1945, c. 22. 
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The first public instalment was, as has been mentioned, the decision by 
Mr. Justice Blair of the Ontario General Division in Ainsley.3 The uproar 
which followed the decision prompted the provincial government to 
establish a Task Force4 to examine a number of issues connected with 
the legislative framework for the activities of the OSC, "with particular 
attention to the policy-making role" of the agency. The Task Force 
circulated an Interim Report for public comment in February 1994, and 
aided by that response, issued its Final Report some four months later.5 
Nor has publication of the Final Report precluded further political and 
judicial developments. The Ainsley case has been appealed, and other 
cases have been launched on related issues.6 However, the emphasis 
here is on Mr. Justice Blair's decision in Ainsley and the report of the 
Task Force that it generated. 
2. AINSLEY FINANCIAL CORPORATION V. ONTARIO 
SECURITIES COMMISSION 
The litigation in Ainsley was prompted by the OSC's publication 
of its Policy 1.10,7 concerning the marketing and sale of "penny stocks", 
which are essentially low-value stock of junior issuers in the over-the-
counter market." The policy purported to provide guidance to dealers in 
' Ainsley Financial Corporation et al. v. OSC et al. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 280 (Gen. 
Div). 
Hie members of the Task Force were: Ronald Daniels (Chair), Associate Professor, 
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto; Elizabeth Atcheson, Director, Policy Branch, 
Financial Institutions, Ministry of Finance; Shane Kelford, Partner, Howard and 
Ryan; Leslie Milrod, Director, Office of the General Counsel, Ontario Securities 
Commission. 
Ontario Task Force on Securities Regulation. Responsibility and Responsiveness: 
Final Report (Queen's Printer, June 1994). 
F A. Manning v. OSC et al. (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 97 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Haldenby, 
I I994| O.J. No. 1865 (Gen. Div.); Pezim v. B.C. (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 
S.( J. No. 58. Since this commentary was completed in October 1994, an appeal 
judgment, upholding Blair J.'sdecision, was rendered by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
on December 21,1994 (Ainsley Financial Corporation v. Ontario Securities Com­
mission (1995). 21 O.R. (3d) 104 (C.A.)). The Securities Amendment Act 1994, 
w hich established a set of purposes and principles for securities legislation, gave the 
OSC rule-making power and clarified the nature and operation of the policy-making 
power, was proclaimed on January 1, 1995. However, certain policies, orders and 
rulings become deemed rules only on March 1, 1995. Detailed consideration of these 
developments is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this commentary. 
Die first draft of this policy was published by the OSC on August 11,1992, and the 
final draft on March 26, 1993. 
More specifically, a "penny stock" was defined in the policy as follows: "... a 
penny stock is an equity security of an issuer and a security convertible into or 
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penny stocks concerning the adoption of "appropriate business prac­
tices" in their interactions with potential investors. The genesis of the 
policy lay in the OSC's concerns about the lack of awareness on the part 
of investors about the risks involved in purchasing these shares, as a 
result of the sales practices employed. Losses sustained by investors for 
these reasons were having "a significant adverse effect on the fairness 
and integrity of the capital markets in Ontario''. 
In furtherance of the objective of promoting better business prac­
tices by these dealers, the policy required that (i) dealers make an as­
sessment of the suitability of an investment for the client, (ii) clients be 
furnished with documents comprising a "risk disclosure statement'"' 
and a "suitability statement'' to give them an understanding of the risks 
they were incurring in investing in these instruments, (iii) the compen­
sation payable to securities dealers be disclosed, (iv) where applicable, 
disclosure be made of the fact that a securities dealer is acting as principal 
in a transaction, (v) trading practices employed by self-regulatory or­
ganizations (SROs) be adopted, (vi) sales-oriented literature should con­
form to standards established in the policy. It is crucial to understand 
that the policy was addressed to only one category of registrant, i.e., so-
called "securities dealers".10 It was issued pursuant to section 27 of the 
statute which vests in the OSC the power to "suspend, cancel, restrict 
or impose terms and conditions upon the registration or reprimand the 
registrant where in its opinion such action is in the public interest'', after 
giving the registrant an opportunity to be heard. In putting forward the 
carrying the right to purchase such a security, including a partnership unit, a common 
share, a preferred share and a warrant or right to purchase such a security . However 
the definition does not include a security: 
(1) listed and posted for trading on; the TSE, the ME, or the ASE and VSE (subject 
to certain requirements in the latter two cases), provided the trade is executed in 
accordance with the regulations of such exchange; 
(2) the issuer of which had assets or revenues above a certain amount; 
(3) in respect of which trades are exempt from registration under s. 35(2) of the Act. 
(4) that has a price of $5 or more, excluding commissions to the securities dealer. 
(5) that is issued by a mutual fund; 
(6) that the OSC may designate from time to time. 
9 See Form 1 of Policy 1.10, (1993), 16 Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin 
(O.S.C.B.) 1479. A precedent for such a statement, though cast in somewhat less 
detailed terms, is provided by Article 20 and Appendix E of OSC Policy 5.2, Con­
solidated Ontario Securities Act (Toronto: Carswell) 890 at 919, 930. 
10 This is a residual category of registrant provided for in s. 98 of R.R.O. 1990, Reg­
ulation 1015, Consolidated Ontario Securities Act, Carswell, 124, and defined as 
follows: "a person or company that is registered for trading in securities and engages 
in the business of trading in securities in the capacity of agent or principal . 
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policy, the Commission also invoked "its general public interest juris­
diction to protect investors and promote and maintain fair, equitable and 
efficient capital markets in Ontario".11 
The OSC's rationale for making the policy applicable only to the 
securities dealer category of registrant was that other registrants who 
were members of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) or Investment 
IX-alers Association (IDA) were already subject to the more fine-grained 
compliance and disciplinary rules of those organizations. While the Act 
and the regulations require registrants to "deal fairly, honestly and in 
good faith"12 with their clients, the Commission was concerned that 
securities dealers ' 'were not complying with these obligations".13 More­
over. while there were at the time of the decision approximately 64 
securities dealers registered in the province, only the plaintiffs in Ainsley 
"were engaged predominantly in the business of dealing in the trading 
of penny stocks" and therefore it was they who were "primarily af­
fected" by the introduction of the policy. The plaintiffs argued that the 
effect of the policy on them would either be to drive them out of business 
or into the arms of one of the SROs, and therefore presumably subject 
them to SRO rules. In making this point, the plaintiffs were obviously 
aware that there is, in Ontario securities policy, a historical preference 
for the regulation of securities market participants to be accomplished 
with the assistance of strong self-regulatory organizations. 
Ilie main ground of argument relied upon by the plaintiffs to sup­
port their contention that Policy 1.10 was invalid was that the OSC 
lacked the jurisdiction to issue the policy. While Mr. Justice Blair ac­
cepted the evidence adduced by the OSC concerning' 'abusive and unfair 
sales practices in the marketing of penny stocks, obtained as a result 
of a comprehensive review" of the industry,14 he agreed with the 
plaintiffs argument that the Commission was acting outside the scope 
of its statutory mandate when it issued Policy 1.10. The judge addressed 
in turn the two legal bases on which the OSC had sought to erect its 
policy. (1) a general public interest jurisdiction or (2) the discretion 
pros ided to the OSC in connection with the registration power in section 
27 of the Act. 
" Policy 1.10 at 2. 
See R.R.O. 1990, s. 197(1). 
" Policy 1.10 at 2. 
Ainsley at _91 -292. This evidence was later described by the Task Force (at 37) as 
a very extensive and thoughtful record". 
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(a) Public Interest Jurisdiction 
An analysis of the provisions of the Securities Act and its regula­
tions turned up no "general jurisdiction to regulate the securities indus­
try in the public interest ,15 only a series of discrete powers to act in the 
public interest with respect to, for example, exemptions from the positive 
regulatory requirements of the Act or orders that trading in a specific 
security cease.16 None of these provisions would support a general 
policy-making power. 
The OSC argued that the authority of the Supreme Court decision 
in Capital Cities Communications,17 which upheld the validity of a 
CRTC policy statement absent an explicit policy-making power in the 
Broadcasting Act, should be determinative of the issue in the present 
case.18 However, Mr. Justice Blair distinguished Capital Cities on three 
grounds: (i) the Securities Act contained no broad mandating section 
such as that contained in the Broadcasting Act which gave the CRTC 
power to "regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broad­
casting system" (ii) the policy in question in Ainsley was not a guideline 
but a "mandatory requirement of a regulatory nature" (iii) the CRTC 
policy statement had been promulgated after "extensive hearings in­
volving the interested parties", in contrast to the situation at bar. 
Of these three distinguishing criteria, Mr. Justice Blair singled out 
the mandatory nature of the policy for more elaborate consideration. He 
reiterated that a close reading of the text of Policy 1.10, as well as 
evidence concerning "the approach of the Commission staff towards its 
implementation", made clear that the OSC viewed the policy not as a 
"mere guideline", to indicate how it might exercise its discretion, but 
rather as "mandatory and regulatory in nature". In other words, the 
OSC was usurping the regulation-making power granted in the statute 
to the Lieutenant Governor in Council by creating a series of new 
"appropriate practices" to be followed by securities dealers. Not only 
did the policy elucidate when section 27, the discipline section, would 
be triggered but it also had the effect of providing specific new grounds 
for mobilizing section 27, if the terms of the policy were not complied 
15 Ainsley at 292. 
;; 0&4 ss. 74,104(2)(c) and 127. 
Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609. 
The OSC had relied on the authority of Capital Cities in its own decision in American 
Diversified Realty (1991), 14 O.S.C.B. 551 at 592-593, where a similar challenge 
was made to its jurisdiction to issue policy statements. 
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with. This theme of the distinction between flexible policy and manda­
tory regulation is likewise at the core of the recommendations of the 
Task Force in its Interim and Final Reports. 
The analysis by Mr. Justice Blair leaves open the question of what 
the court's response would have been had the document not been framed 
in such preemptory language.19 Had Policy 1.10 been framed as provid­
ing only "guidelines" to good practice for dealers, it is likely that the 
OSC would still have used adherence to the requirements outlined in the 
policy as reasons to refuse or grant registration in individual cases, given 
the "ampl[e] justification]" for its assessment of the need for such 
discipline to be imposed on penny stock dealers. This might have solved 
the jurisdictional problem, while leaving the regulatory objective intact. 
In other words, the effect of the Ainsley decision is to focus on the 
importance of the form for achieving regulatory goals (mandatory reg­
ulation as opposed to flexible policy) at the expense of debate about the 
substance of those goals.20 
However, the position taken by Mr. Justice Blair seems to have 
been that even this strategy would not necessarily have been successful. 
In his judgment, "[e]ven if the Policy is not mandatory in its nature... 
but simply issued "as a guide'' which is ' 'intended to inform interested 
parties that the Commission will be guided by [it] in exercising its public 
interest jurisdiction under subsection 27(1) of the Act", it still consti­
tutes regulation, or is tantamount thereto, in my view".21 Leaving aside 
the issue of how to define instruments that are "tantamount to regula­
tion", this proposition seems to leave very little room at all for the 
existence of policy statements as a legitimate tool of regulation. The 
articulation by Mr. Justice Blair here of a circumscribed role for the 
OSC seems to hark back to an earlier era in the history of judicial attitudes 
to Regulatory agencies, when their activities were viewed with consid­
erable suspicion. 
See the comment by the Task Force (at 16) that "(B)ased on our reading of the 
Supreme Court decision in Capital Cities .. ., we believe that the absence of specific 
statutory authorization for policy statements is not fatal to the legitimate use [my 
emphasis] of this instrument by the Commission". 
I am not necessarily arguing here that such a debate was one that should have been 
entered into by Mr. Justice Blair, since that would be subject to the principles of 
judicial review, but only that jurisdictional issues can be used to forestall substantive 
debate about the adequacy of regulatory goals and strategies for achieving those 
goals. This point is elaborated below. 
;i Ainsley at 297. 
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(b) Section 27 Powers 
Having disposed of the Commission's assertion of a general juris­
diction to make policy in the public interest, Mr. Justice Blair addressed 
the more specific plank of the agency's putative basis for Policy 1.10. 
The key to his decision on this ground of argument lay in his interpre­
tation of the language of section 27 as providing only for individualized 
decisions, pursuant to a hearing concerning specific registrants.22 Thus 
the public interest jurisdiction afforded by section 27 extended only to 
considerations made on a case-by-case basis, with no ' 'authority to make 
prospective proclamations of general application for all affected regis­
trants". Once more, the potential role of policy-making in providing 
useful guidelines to indicate how the case-by-case discretion would be 
exercised is again accorded little priority. This is undoubtedly a conser­
vative approach to the role and importance of policy-making in regula­
tory activity. 
An irony of the distinction relied on by Mr. Justice Blair between 
the regulatory powers accorded to the Lieutenant Governor in Council, 
under the Securities Act, and the case-by-case decision-making powers 
given to the Commission,23 is the existence of section 105 of the Regu­
lations.24 This provides that: 
The Commission may prescribe conditions of registration for a registrant or group 
of registrants that are in lieu of some or all of the conditions of registration 
prescribed..., where it gives prior notice of the proposed conditions to registrants 
affected and affords the registrant an opportunity to be heard and the Commission 
publishes notice in a publication published by the Commission of each instance 
when it so prescribes. 
In other words, in section 105 the OSC was delegated the power to make 
regulations with respect to conditions of registration, including the han­
dling of new accounts and supervision of account procedures, both issues 
which are dealt with in Policy 1.10. This delegation of regulation-making 
22 Mr. Justice Blair pointed out (at 296-297) that contrary to the terms of s. 27. no 
hearing was held prior to the introduction of Policy 1.10. He went on to note thai 
"one of the complaints of the plaintiffs" was that "they were not consulted in any 
meaningful way", whereas others (i.e., their competitors) were consulted, and as a 
result of that consultation, were exempted from the dictates of the policy. However, 
when draft Policy 1.10 was released, Ainsley Financial Corporation, as well as the 
Securities Dealers Association, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Investment 
Dealers Association, all provided a response to the Commission. The plaintiffs were 
presumably referring to some earlier opportunity provided to the TSE and the IDA 
10 8've input concerning the terms of the policy. 
23 See above at pp. 227-228. 
R.R.O.1990, Regulation 1015, at 125. 
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power was subjected to certain procedural requirements, in particular, 
that of prior notice to registrants. Presumably however, had the OSC 
exercised its powers under section 105, the provisions would have had 
to conform both to the parliamentary rules concerning their approval 
and the obligation to afford registrants the "opportunity to be heard". 
Mr. Justice Blair did not deal extensively with the implications of the 
existence of section 105 for the arguments made in the case, but con­
tented himself with remarking that the OSC "has apparently chosen not 
to follow this route in paving the way for the introduction of the pol­
icy"." 
In conclusion, underlying the Ainsley decision is a circumscribed 
view of the utility of policy-making by administrative agencies and of 
the appropriate kind of regulatory decision-making. It is a view that 
underrates the significance of the expertise developed by an agency in 
-; dealing with regulatory problems over time, and in fact seems to actively 
>• discourage them from making use of that expertise. The seriousness of 
C the issues raised by the case, of course, lie in the fact that the absence 
t of a jurisdiction on which to base a policy-making power has implica-
ft 
r tions for Securities Commission policy far outside the securities dealer 
or registration area. It was this general concern about the uncertain status 
of OSC policy statements which prompted the provincial government 
to establish the Task Force on Securities Regulation, to whose deliber-




- " Mr. Justice Blair's comments here also demonstrate the confusion that can be gen­
erated from what appear to be overlapping regulatory powers granted to two bodies. 
The Lieutenant Governor has been granted powers to regulate in areas concerning 
the furnishing of information to the public by registrants, regulation of trading in the 
OTC market, the prescribing of documents and forms to be filed under the Act, and 
matters respecting the content and distribution of material distributed with respect 
to securities. Mr. Justice Blair argued that because of this, the Lieutenant Governor 
already "occupied the field" with respect to the matters covered in Policy 1.10, 
therefore the OSC would not even have had jurisdiction to introduce them as regu­
lations. This is despite the fact that s. 105 of the Regulations gives the Commission 
power to prescribe conditions of registration in lieu of conditions already prescribed 
in various sections, including s. 114, which refers to the requirement that "every 
registered dealer ... shall establish procedures for dealing with its clients that con­
form with prudent business practice and that enable it to service its clients adequately 
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3. ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION: FINAL REPORT 
As mentioned above, the Task Force continued the theme identified 
in Ainsley of the importance of the distinction in administrative law 
doctrine between policies and regulations or rules, as they are designated 
in American administrative law. The major recommendations26 of the 
Task Force can therefore be considered under three heads: (i) a grant to 
the OSC of a legally sanctioned power to make policy statements (ii) 
the establishment of a rule-making power for the agency with various 
procedural prerequisites (iii) the revision of the Securities Act to incor­
porate a "purposes and principles" section such as exists in other juris­
dictions, notably Quebec. Let us address each of these issues in turn. 
(a) Policy-Making 
The recommendations of the Task Force under this head began by 
enumerating several advantages to be gained by the use of policy state­
ments in the context of securities regulation. These include consistency 
and predictability for constituents, comprehensiveness in the treatment 
of issues, the opportunity for constituents to inform policy development, 
the opportunity for flexibility of application on the basis of infringement 
of policy objectives or public interest concerns (since they ' 'do not have 
the force of law"), guidance as to the appropriateness of enforcement 
action, national and international regulatory coordination. Yet, accord­
ing to the Task Force, these advantages, in particular that of flexibility 
of application on the basis of contextual judgments, have been dimin­
ished by the agency's tendency to treat its policy statements as manda­
tory and as "equivalent to legislation",27 without engaging in the "pro­
c e d u r e s  a n d  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  l a w - m a k i n g ' ' T h i s  
means, in the case of legislation and regulations, "direct oversight by 
representatives of the elected branch of government". The solution to 
this regulatory overreaching favoured by the Task Force was to provide 
explicit statutory authority for the agency to develop and implement 
The Task Force received 34 submissions from individuals and organizations to its 
first request for comments, and 27 in response to the publication of the Interim 
Report. A summary of those responses is very usefully presented in Appendices IV 
^ and Vn of the Final Report. 
See the first round submission by Mr. James Baillie to the Task Force, quoted in the 
Final Report at 14. 
Final Report at 16. 
230 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [10 B.F.L.R.] 
policies with an accompanying stipulation that such instruments would 
be for guidance only and would not have the force of law.29 
Definition of Policies: Since the Task Force went on to recommend a 
power for the OSC to make mandatory rules, it was necessary to provide 
some indication of the distinction between the respective roles of policies 
and rules. The Report therefore provides a definition of a policy state­
ment, to be included in a revised statute. It is a statement (a) of the 
principles or factors influencing an exercise of discretionary authority 
by the OSC, (b) outlining the interpretation or application by the OSC 
of statutory provisions, regulations or rules, and (c) of regulatory practice 
in the performance of statutory duties and responsibilities. This articu­
lation of the role of policies allows us to see their importance in filling 
the gap created by a political commitment to the value of experience 
and expertise in regulating aspects of economic and social activity. 
Policies are necessary to proactively structure individual exercises of 
discretion based on interpretations of the public interest on the one hand, 
and to elaborate and render more specific the general provisions of 
statutes and regulations on the other. Interestingly, the Task Force rec­
ognized that even the rules to be created by the OSC could not be 
sufficiently precise to be determinative in all novel, borderline or un­
foreseen circumstances. It is notable too that the Task Force was prepared 
to countenance a broader and more proactive role for policies in the 
regulation of securities markets than that expressed by Mr. Justice Blair 
in Aitisley, when faced with the context at issue there. 
Further insight into the Task Force's view of the contribution of 
policies to the regulatory enterprise is provided in its recommendations 
for a "full review" to be undertaken by the OSC of its existing policies, 
to determine whether or not they are "proper policy statements" (i.e. 
non-mandatory), whether they should be redrafted to become proper 
policies, or be elevated to the status of rules.30 Policies should contain 
"general statements of principle or practice, and should not include 
mandatory and comprehensive codes of conduct". However, policies 
can address "fairly specific issues".31 The former articulation of the 
N Final Report at 17. 
10 For details of the proposed transitional arrangements for policies, which would have 
significant resource implications for the OSC, see the Final Report at 40-43. 
Elsewhere in the Report, it is argued that the content of policies is to be formulated 
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appropriate content of policies seems to leave insufficient room for them 
to fulfil the functions assigned to them by the Task Force. If a policy is 
to be useful in structuring discretion concerning exercises of a "public 
interest" mandate, or providing interpretations of broad statutory pro­
visions, it is hard to see how it can itself be general or vague. It is 
presumably possible for a policy to be specific while avoiding being 
mandatory. 
Notice and Comment Requirements: Finally, the expectation that 
policy statements "will continue to play an enduring and important role 
in the securities law regime" is evidenced by the contrast between the 
Interim and Final Reports' position on a notice and comment process 
for policy-making. The Interim Report had suggested that there was a 
less urgent need for a formal notice and comment process for policies if 
these statements, which would previously have been mandatory, would 
now be recast as rules. The Task Force had even expressed a concern 
that such "costly and cumbersome" procedural obligations on the 
agency would act as a disincentive to the "expeditious articulation of 
policy". However, as a result of the negative response it received to this 
aspect of its recommendations, revolving around the need for "public 
deliberation and debate" to provide safeguards against the abuse of 
policy-making power, the Final Report recommended that a notice and 
comment obligation for policies be adopted in a revised statute. This 
process would nevertheless be "relaxed in certain material respects" 
from the one recommended for rules.32 It is to be hoped that this relax­
ation will ultimately be sufficient to avoid the problem of "regulatory 
gridlock" which characterizes the policy-making of some American 
regulatory agencies. 
(b) Rule-Making 
Given the arguments mobilized in the Report against "mandatory 
policy statements, which were, in the main, that they do not ensure 
"proper deliberation, debate, and accountability", the decision by the 
Task Force to plump for a rule-making power for the OSC rather than 
"pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Act", which are recommended to 
be specified therein. 
32 The relaxation here revolved around a shorter public comment period and an absence 
of Cabinet involvement. 
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revitalized regulation-making by Cabinet is interesting. The position 
adopted here, in contrast to that taken with respect to policy statements, 
is that the "intensity of the demand for Cabinet time" along with "the 
technical nature of securities regulation" militates against enhanced 
involvement by a democratically-elected body. On the contrary, the need 
for a ' 'high degree of specialized expertise by persons familiar not only 
with the framework and philosophy of securities regulation, but also 
market practice" prompted the Task Force to recommend the conferral 
of a rule-making power on the OSC, which rules would have the same 
force and effect as Cabinet regulations. This recommendation had gar­
nered "widespread public support", including from the OSC itself, 
during the Task Force's deliberations.33 
Revision of Section 143: The mechanism for achieving the grant of 
rule-making power had generated some controversy in the responses to 
the Interim Report where it was first outlined.34 The resolution proffered 
by the Final Report was to redraft section 143(1) of the Securities Act 
in a detailed fashion so as to enumerate all of the areas where the OSC 
would be empowered to make rules, subject to an open-ended "basket 
provision", providing for rule-making "respecting any other matter 
authorized by or required to implement any provision of this Act". This 
approach was asserted to enhance "market certainty" by providing 
precise support for all existing subordinate instruments except for those 
few policy statements or subject matters which ... are characterised as 
controversial". 
Exclusions from the Rule-Making Power: The singling out of several 
policy statements as controversial warrants further attention. In these 
areas, enumerated in Appendix 1, Part II of the Final Report, the decision 
is left to the legislature as to whether they should be subject to OSC 
The possibility of according a rule-making power to the OSC was first alluded to by 
Mr. Justice Blair in Ainsley, quoting approvingly from an article by Professor Jeffrey 
Macintosh entitled The Excessive Use of Policy Statements by Canadian Securities 
Regulators" (1992), 1 Corporate Financing 19 at 20. 
The Interim Report had proposed that sufficient legal authorization for the rule­
making power could be obtained from the proposed "purposes and principles" 
statement in the statute. Some of the respondents to the Interim Report considered 
this "insufficiently precise" to "prevent abuse by a future Commission". On the 
other hand, the OSC itself considered that such a section would not provide enough 
guidance for the resolution of potential conflicts between existing policies, to be 
elevated to rules, and the legislation itself. 
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rule-making powers. And what are these areas? They are (i) the power 
to prescribe additional requirements in respect of market participants, 
including requirements concerning disclosure of information by them 
to the public, membership in an SRO, and requirements with respect to 
take-over bids and related party transactions, (ii) the regulation of de­
fensive tactics in response to take-over bids, (iii) the regulation of related 
party transactions. It is with respect to these specific exclusions from 
recommendations for a rule-making power for the OSC that we see the 
close connection between debate about the jurisdictional adequacy of 
OSC actions and debate about the appropriateness of the substantive 
regulatory goals of the agency and its interpretation of the public interest. 
The first of these controversial areas refers to matters that include the 
impugned Policy 1.10 itself, while the third refers to OSC Policy 9.1, 
which is singled out for specific attention several times in the course of 
the Task Force's Final Report.35 
The sources of the controversy about these particular exercises of 
regulatory power are not well defined by the Task Force. It was initially 
generated, apparently, by ' 'some in the Ontario capital markets", which 
presumably includes a number of those individuals and organizations 
making submissions to the Task Force itself. The grounds for the con­
troversy have to do with "the appropriate relationship of securities and 
corporate law",36 and specifically a concern that securities regulators 
are intervening in matters more properly the realm of corporate law and 
the courts. While this may be a valid issue for debate in connection with 
Policy 9.1 and defensive tactics, it is hard to see how it applies to Policy 
1.10, since the OSC has long had regulatory responsibility for the activ­
ities of securities market participants. The Task Force may well be right 
that the legitimacy of these aspects of OSC activity should be decided 
upon by the legislature, in accordance with democratic principles. How-
35 See Final Report at v, 15, 32, 39. OSC Policy 9.1 creates an extensive set of 
procedural requirements to be adhered to by issuers who wish to engage in ' "related 
party" or "going private" transactions, or insider or issuer bids, all of which terms 
are defined in the policy. The requirements imposed with respect to the transaction 
or bid consist of three separate aspects, subject to the possibility of an exemption, 
(i) disclosure of information, (ii) valuation, and (iii) majority of the minority ap­
proval. A fourth procedure, the establishment of an independent committee of the 
board to review the transaction or bid, is recommended. 
36 Rnal Report at 1-63. 
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ever, an important first step might be an acknowledgment that the emer­
gence of calls for democratic re-evaluation in these areas may not be 
unconnected to the unhappiness of specific regulatory constituencies 
with substantive regulation imposed on them by an active administrative 
agency. If this is the case, the question of the appropriateness of defi­
nitions of the public interest expressed in policies such as 1.10 or 9.1 
should be squarely and publicly addressed on its merits, rather than 
being framed more narrowly as an issue of jurisdictional competence to 
make policies. 
Role of Cabinet: A key component of the rule-making provisions rec­
ommended by the Task Force is the right of Cabinet disapproval or 
amendment, within 60 days of adoption of the rule by the Commission. 
Here the Task Force favoured arguments that such a process ensured 
agency accountability over countervailing claims that it would under­
mine the independence of the OSC from "partisan political influence". 
The Report envisages that Cabinet would consider only those rules 
"referred by the Minister" for its attention, and that the "disapproval 
process would be invoked only sparingly". More frequent disapproval 
risked provoking the disaffection of regulatory constituencies from ac­
tive participation in OSC deliberations.37 Conversely, of course, the right 
of Cabinet amendment of OSC rules may give regulatory constituents a 
further avenue of influence over the ultimate content of OSC rules. 
Notice and Comment Process: Legislative provision for an elaborated 
notice and comment process was considered by the Task Force to be the 
most effective safeguard against the regulatory hubris that might oth­
erwise result from the grant of rule-making power. "Informed involve­
ment by stakeholders" was seen as crucial to the maintenance of "ac­
countability and transparency" in the rule-making process. The 
mechanics of this process that were favoured by the Task Force are 
outlined in the Report.38 A key initiative involved the responsibility to 
Cabinet jurisdiction to make regulations was recommended to be co-extensive with 
the OSC power to make rules, but it was expected that the initiative would be taken, 
in the future as at present, by the agency itself. 
Final Report at 36. These involve published requests for comments, a 90-day time 
period to make submissions, a subsequent — though attenuated — notice and com­
ment period if material amendments" are made to the rule, publication of the final 
rule in the Bulletin and publication of the Cabinet response 
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be assumed by the OSC in the notice and comment process,39 though 
the Report stopped short of requiring mandatory public hearings.40 
(c) Statutory Provision for Purposes and Principles 
The final significant — and long overdue — legislative innovation 
proposed by the Task Force is the enactment of a "purposes and prin­
ciples" section in the statute. For some decades now, the dual purposes 
of investor protection and maintaining fair and efficient markets have 
been cited, by both the OSC and commentators, as the prevailing moti­
vators of regulatory activity. This occurs in spite of there being no 
definitive statutory recognition of their validity.41 The proposal of the 
Task Force fills this void. Accordingly, it recommends that the purposes 
to be legislatively enshrined are: (a) to provide protection to investors 
from unfair, improper, or fraudulent practices and (b) to foster fair and 
efficient capital markets and confidence in such markets so as to enhance 
and facilitate capital formation. For the Task Force, the renewed impor­
tance of an explicit statement of purposes lies partly in its role in inform­
ing any further policy-making by the OSC.42 
Acknowledging the looseness of this statement of purposes, the 
Task Force goes on to enunciate certain "fundamental principles" that 
should be used "to direct and structure the OSC's interpretation of the 
Act's purposes". Collectively, the effect of these principles is to artic­
ulate the range of regulatory strategies necessary to achieve the stated 
purposes, while acknowledging that, in any given context, these pur­
poses may have to be' 'balanced'' against each other. Thus the principles 
indicate that the primary regulatory strategies are the "timely, accurate 
and efficient disclosure of information", the prevention of fraud, and 
the assessment of the "fitness" of market participants, along with 
"timely, open and efficient" enforcement of the Act's provisions. The 
historical commitment in the Ontario scheme of securities regulation to 
the role of SROs is also explicitly reinforced, as are the needs to coor-
39 See the discussion of the need for an OSC "supporting statement at 37 and a 
"summary of comments" at 38. 
40 The Report at 40 also proposed the possibility of a waiver of the notice and comment 
process in "matters of urgency". 
41 Of course, both commentators and decision-makers give differing weights at differ­
ent times to these diverse objectives. 
42 Final Report at 17. 
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dinate provincially-based securities regimes and to pay attention to 
"business and regulatory costs" in the realization of regulatory objec­
tives. The declaration of these principles will not, of course, determine 
very many specific regulatory outcomes, but their importance lies in the 
signal they send concerning the authority and trust reposed in the agency 
to decide, from a range of alternatives and instruments, how best to 
achieve the Act's purposes. 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
' 'The interesting issue is not how well bureaucracies are controlled, but rather the 
balance between expertise and accountability in different policy areas and the 
limits or constraints on each."43 
Clearly, the policy-making powers of the OSC have needed for 
some time to be put on a firmer legal footing. Equally clearly, the result 
of a grant of rule-making power to the OSC would be to expand signif­
icantly its powers to regulate issuers and members of SROs, subject to 
the safeguards of Cabinet disapproval and the notice and comment proc­
ess. The interesting lessons of Ainsley and the Task Force Final Report 
revolve around their respective visions of the regulatory enterprise and 
the scope to be given to the agency to satisfy regulatory objectives. In 
the view of this observer, the Task Force strikes a more appropriate 
"balance between expertise and accountability" in its recognition that 
policies will continue to be necessary for effective and responsive reg­
ulation of the securities industry, and that the OSC should have the 
power to promulgate mandatory rules. 
Yet there are several worrying features of the Task Force's ap­
proach. An administrative lawyer might worry about the clarity of the 
distinction between matters to be the subject of a policy instrument and 
those to be the subject of rules. She might also worry about whether 
sufficient guidance is provided to the OSC concerning the point at which 
rule-making should be instituted, and about the risk that the imposition 
of extensive procedural requirements will present serious resource dif­
ficulties for an already stretched agency. More generally, the Final Re­
port contains various references to the important role of the "public" 
and the responsible citizen'' in providing input to the regulatory proc­
ess. As a recommendation for the future this is indeed a laudable pro-
Khademian, A., The SEC and Capital Market Regulation (University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1992) at 210. 
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posal, in that it may assist in democratizing this arena of economic life. 
As a description of what happens at present however, it is somewhat 
disingenuous to suggest that those without an ongoing, direct and pro­
fessional interest in influencing regulatory outcomes currently play any 
significant role in making policy submissions to the agency or com­
menting on draft documents. Thus when the Task Force refers44 to a lack 
of "public appreciation" for the rationale of Policy 1.10, it may be 
blurring the distinction between those with an immediate and direct 
stake in the content of the policy and those without such an interest. 
The point being made here is that there is a need to acknowledge 
the role of interested constituencies in framing regulatory agendas and 
influencing the course and content of regulatory debate. One interpre­
tation of the genesis of the current concern about the OSC's jurisdiction 
is that the plaintiffs in Ainsley were using the jurisdictional argument 
about lack of policy-making authority as a stalling strategy to prevent 
the application of an onerous policy to their professional endeavours. 
This turned out to be successful despite the fact that there was evidence 
of considerable regulatory justification for the policy. Neither can it be 
doubted that there were other strategies available to the OSC to achieve 
its objectives. The same result could well have been accomplished by 
means of the powers granted in section 105 of the Regulations, or more 
dramatically, by recommending to the legislature that it force the crea­
tion of an SRO for that segment of the industry. There is historical 
precedent for such a strategy. In the 1940s, the then Chair of the OSC, 
McTague, claimed a central role in the passage of the Act to provide for 
the establishment of the Broker Dealers Association,45 a self-regulatory 
organization for the predecessors of the penny stock dealers.46 
To reiterate, by focusing on the OSC's competence to use various 
regulatory instruments, we risk losing sight of the fact that the debate 
may, in essence, be about substantive interpretations of the public inter­
est, and who is to have the power to make those interpretations. Juris­
dictional confrontations may be, in some cases, only one move in a 
bigger game of the politics of regulation, which is about the ongoing 
44 Final Report at 37. 
45 S.0.1947, c. 8. 
44 For further details, see Condon, M.G., Ideas and Regulatory Practice: The Ontario 
Securities Commission, 1945-1978, S.J.D. Thesis, Faculty of Law, Universily of 
Toronto, 1991. 
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efforts of regulatory constituents to have their interests met in the ad­
ministrative process and their particular interpretations of concepts such 
as the "public interest" validated by the agency. 
At the moment, the OSC has been accorded the status of expert 
decision-maker and policy-maker in the securities arena. In this position, 
it is expected to respond to emerging problems with a view to achieving 
legislative objectives. There is precedent for the agency to develop 
policy which is not contemplated in the legislative framework. In 1968, 
the OSC introduced, by means of policy statement, a scheme for requir­
ing the "timely disclosure" of "material and significant information" 
hy issuers regulated under the Securities Act. This concept of timely 
disclosure is now a staple of the legislative framework. My point here 
is not that there is no need for adequate legal authority for administrative 
action, but rather that it is in the nature of regulatory innovation to 
sometimes outstrip legislative oversight. Before legitimate regulatory 
objectives are conclusively derailed by the strategic mobilization of 
jurisdictional devices, we need to give due weight to the expertise side 
ot the expertise/accountability balance, and we should be clear-sighted 
about the sources from which challenges to substantive regulatory ob­
jectives come. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The "Good Banking Code of Practice" 
of the United Kingdom 
Dennis Rosenthal* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In January 1987 the Government, together with the Bank of Eng­
land, commissioned the Review Committee under the Chairmanship of 
Professor Robert Jack to conduct an assessment of the existing legislative 
framework for banking services. The Committee's finding was that 
whilst the legislative framework had stood the test of time there were a 
number of areas where banking practice could be improved. The recom­
mendations included that banks should promulgate a Code of Banking 
Practice on standards of best practice and that, if considered necessary, 
the Government should in due course enact enabling legislation to sup­
port a statutory Code of Banking Practice.1 
The Government fully endorsed the Committee's recommendation 
for a non-statutory statement of best practice covering all the areas 
referred to in the Review Committee's Report.2 The Government spec­
ified, in particular, that customers should be given information in clear 
and simple language about the terms of their contract with their banker 
and the rights and obligations that are to apply on both sides; should be 
told of their right to privacy which the law already affords and the very 
limited circumstances in which any information about their personal 
finances may be passed on; how to lodge a complaint if it proves nec­
essary; how such complaints should be dealt with and how matters may 
be referred to the relevant ombudsman; what banking charges may be 
levied and in what circumstances; and that they should be given a simple 
explanation of the timing of the cheque clearing cycle and when they 
might normally expect a cheque to be cleared. 
* Solicitor, Partner Banking and Finance Group Forsyte Saunders Kerman, London. 
1 U.K. Banking Services: Law and Practice — Report by the Review Committee Cm. 
622 (London HMSO 1989) (Chairman: Professor R.B. Jack), reviewed in (1989-90) 
5 B.F.L.R. 397. 
1 White Paper: Banking Services: Law and Practice, Cm. 1026, March 1990. 
